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Valuing Government Guarantees
Fannie and Freddie Revisited
Deborah Lucas and Robert McDonald
6.1    Introduction
The federal government explicitly guarantees a portion of deposit obli-
gations of commercial banks and thrifts through deposit insurance, and 
is thought to provide protection beyond this legal obligation for institu-
tions considered “too big to fail.” Although not explicitly guaranteed until 
recently, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac also have been longtime beneﬁ  ciaries 
of similar federal protection of their debt securities against default.
Despite the perception that Fannie and Freddie derive value from the 
implicit guarantee and pose signiﬁ  cant risk to the government, quantifying 
the federal exposure is diﬃcult and there is substantial disagreement in the 
literature about magnitudes. In general, spread-  based estimates of guaran-
tee value for Fannie and Freddie are signiﬁ  cantly higher than options- based 
estimates. Spread- based estimates capitalize the diﬀerence between the inter-
est expense of Fannie and Freddie and that of similarly rated ﬁ  nancial insti-
tutions.1 Using this approach, Passmore (2005) reports a present value over 
twenty- ﬁ  ve years in the range of $122 to $182 billion as the subsidy to Fan-
nie and Freddie. At the other extreme, in a study commissioned by Fannie 
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1. In CBO (2001), based on the analysis of Ambrose and Warga (2002), the comparison 
is made using a “stand-  alone” rating for Fannie and Freddie, which reﬂ  ects their risk to the 
government. As of April 2008, the GSEs had a stand-  alone rating of AA–   from S&P. See also 
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Mae using an options pricing approach, Stiglitz, Orszag, and Orszag (2002) 
conclude that the cost of an implicit guarantee to the government does not 
exceed $200 million. In a recent paper also using an options pricing approach 
(Lucas and McDonald 2006), we estimate a present value cost over twenty-
 ﬁ ve years of $28 billion for the two enterprises, still an order of magnitude 
lower than in Passmore (2005).2
There are several possible explanations for the higher subsidy values gen-
erally implied by spread-  based analyses. One is that the guarantee may be 
valued by investors in government-  sponsored enterprises (GSE) securities 
not just because of the direct value of protection from default risk, but also 
because of other beneﬁ  ts such as increased liquidity, or because they satisfy 
regulatory restrictions. Thus, the reduction in the GSEs’ borrowing costs 
may exceed the cost of expected defaults to the government. Whether these 
other beneﬁ  ts to GSE stakeholders should be included in a calculation of 
government cost depends on the question at hand. From a broad opportu-
nity cost perspective, since other ﬁ  nancial institutions would pay to obtain 
the same privileges, they are part of the cost. To answer the narrower ques-
tion of the expected cost of defaults, it is probably appropriate to exclude 
the value of these sorts of additional beneﬁ  ts.
The theoretical model developed here suggests another reason that spread-
  based models overestimate guarantee values: they do not correct for the 
more conservative optimal default policy of an insured ﬁ  rm. To preserve the 
ability to borrow at a risk-  free rate in the future, we show that a guaranteed 
ﬁ  rm will choose to make debt payments in some states of the world where 
an otherwise identical uninsured ﬁ  rm would default, lowering the cost to 
the government relative to what a spread-  based estimate would imply. This 
ﬁ  nding is related to a large body of earlier work on risk taking, charter value, 
and bank regulation (see, e.g., Demsetz, Saidenberg, and Strahan [1996] and 
the references therein). As far as we know, however, this analysis is the ﬁ  rst 
to highlight the implications for credit spreads as potentially biased estima-
tors of subsidy value.
A further possibility is that simple options-  based models fail to capture 
important dimensions of risk, and thereby underestimate the cost and risk 
to the government of providing insurance. To explore this possibility, we 
consider several possibilities that have not been taken into account in past 
options-  based estimates for Fannie and Freddie. First, we develop a theo-
retical model to examine whether and how the presence of a guarantee may 
aﬀect the statistical relation between equity and asset value, and hence aﬀect 
the imputation of asset value and volatility. We then calibrate and simu-
late a generalized version of the model to consider its quantitative implica-
tions, and to incorporate a process for the evolution of assets that includes a 
jump as well as a diﬀusion component. In light of episodes such as Fannie’s 
2. See also CBO (2004), Feldman (1999), and Hubbard (2004).Valuing Government Guarantees: Fannie and Freddie Revisited    1 3 3
accounting restatements and subsequent fall in share price and the spike in 
credit losses following the wave of subprime defaults, we also explore the 
sensitivity of options-  based estimates to initial conditions for equity value 
and volatility. In all variations, we report insurance value in terms of an 
annual premium as well as reporting a present value, making costs easier to 
interpret and normalizing for the estimation horizon.
The simulation results suggest that an insurance premium of 20 to 30 basis 
points (bps) would have been fair compensation for the default risk assumed 
by the government at year-  end 2005. Cost estimates of this magnitude are 
still smaller than from some spread-  based analyses, but they are in line 
with others—for instance, the Congressional Budget Oﬃce (CBO) (2001) 
reports a GSE borrowing advantage of 41 bps over comparable nonguaran-
teed ﬁ  nancial institutions. The results also show that the fair premium rate 
increases rapidly with the leverage ratio, suggesting a much higher fair rate 
following the decline in asset values starting in late 2007.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2 pro-
vides a brief description of Fannie and Freddie, their risk exposure, and 
the regulatory environment. In section 6.3 we present the valuation model 
and discuss the eﬀect of the government guarantee on the dynamic relation 
between the underlying assets and the value of equity. Section 6.4 describes 
the calibration used to quantify the value of the guarantee, and reports the 
results of sensitivity analysis. Section 6.5 concludes.
6.2    Background
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are government-  sponsored enterprises 
(GSEs) that were created by Congress to provide liquidity and stability in 
the home mortgage market. They also are required to meet modest goals 
for low-  income lending. The GSEs are hybrids of private corporations and 
federal entities. Although their debt securities explicitly state that they do 
not bear a government guarantee, their many federal ties and critical role 
in the housing and ﬁ  nancial markets suggest otherwise. As a consequence, 
the GSEs raise capital through debt ﬁ  nancing at a narrower spread over 
Treasury rates than similarly rated ﬁ  nancial institutions, an advantage that 
is generally viewed as an unbooked federal subsidy.
Fannie and Freddie participate in the mortgage market in two distinct ways. 
One is by buying mortgages and ﬁ  nancing the purchases with debt issues. 
Those on-  balance-  sheet holdings expose the enterprises to default, interest 
rate, and prepayment risk. The interest rate and prepayment risk is partially 
hedged with the use of derivatives and dynamic hedging strategies (see Jaﬀee 
[2003]). They also securitize mortgages, an oﬀ- balance- sheet activity in which 
Fannie and Freddie assume default risk by issuing a credit guarantee.
The rapid growth of on-  balance-  sheet holdings in the 1990s increasingly 
raised concerns about the government’s risk exposure, speciﬁ  cally about 134        Deborah Lucas and Robert McDonald
unhedged interest rate and prepayment risk (Frame and White 2005). 
Following the discovery of accounting irregularities at Fannie Mae,3 its on- 
balance- sheet growth was temporarily slowed by a consent order from their 
regulator that limited its mortgage portfolio to $727 billion, down from 
the $904 billion it held at year-  end 2004. Fannie’s mortgage-  backed secu-
rity (MBS) outstanding continued to grow, and reached $1.77 trillion as 
of November 2006. The consent decree was lifted in late 2007, after which 
growth in its on-  balance-  sheet obligations resumed. At year-  end 2005, the 
time we focus on for the base case analysis of guarantee values, Freddie Mac 
had a comparable exposure to Fannie Mae, with $710 billion of mortgages 
held on balance sheet, and $1.34 trillion in MBS outstanding.
With the sharp downturn in the housing market that began in 2007, con-
cerns about default risk—previously thought to be a minor concern—caused 
the stock price of both companies to plummet. Fair value estimates reported 
by the GSEs in early 2008 indicated that Freddie has negative equity value, 
and that Fannie was barely solvent. In July 2008, Congress granted Treasury 
the authority to infuse funds into the entities as needed over the next eigh-
teen months, eﬀectively making the implicit guarantee explicit, and incur-
ring a present value cost to taxpayers estimated by the Congressional Budget 
Oﬃce (CBO) to be $25 billion (CBO 2008). Treasury used this authority two 
months later to take both GSEs into federal conservatorship.
An independent regulator oversees the operations of the GSEs, but their 
activities are primarily constrained by statute.4 By law, assets consist pri-
marily of conforming mortgages, and the enterprises must meet minimum 
capital requirements.5 Typically both ﬁ  rms maintain slightly more than the 
regulatory minimum capital, although capital on occasion has been a bind-
ing constraint. As for commercial banks with deposit insurance, economic 
theory predicts that to maximize the value of the implicit guarantee the 
enterprises would manage liabilities to keep capital close to the regulatory 
minimum.
Historically, the stock of both ﬁ  rms consistently outperformed the overall 
market. Even before the recent turmoil in the housing market, however, stock 
price volatility had increased and returns declined. Whether the historically 
high returns can be attributed to unanticipated growth in the implicit subsidy 
3. Fannie Mae was found by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to have over-
stated proﬁ  ts by an estimated $9 billion starting in the late 1990s.
4. Created in 1992, the Oﬃce of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO), an in-
dependent entity within the Department of Housing and Urban Development, had limited 
regulatory authority over Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The Housing and Economic Recovery 
Act of 2008 created a new and stronger regulator to supersede OFHEO, the Federal Housing 
Finance Agency (FHFA). The FHFA now has oversight responsibility for the Federal Home 
Loan Banks as well as for Fannie and Freddie.
5. Current legislative proposals would increase the conforming mortgage limits in high-  cost 
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is a matter of some debate. Many observers contend that GSE stockholders 
beneﬁ  t from their special status, but the enterprises counter that competitive 
pressure forces any cost advantage to be passed through to borrowers (Naranjo 
and Toevs 2002). To the extent that rents are captured by stockholders, returns 
should be aﬀected by unanticipated changes in the value of the perceived guar-
antee, and Seiler (2003) presents some evidence of this eﬀect. In any event the 
stock returns on the two ﬁ  rms are highly correlated, suggesting that they are 
aﬀected by common risk factors including common regulatory risk.
6.3    Modeling  Guarantee  Value
We take an options pricing approach to modeling the dynamics of guaran-
tee value and risk exposure. The model is based on the fundamental insight 
of Sharpe (1976) and Merton (1977), that insurance can be valued as a 
put option on the assets of the ﬁ  rm. To illustrate the basic idea of how the 
guarantee is valued, and to understand its eﬀect on the relation between 
observed equity valuations and the unobserved value of operating assets, 
we begin by analyzing a simple closed- form model where debt is adjusted at 
ﬁ  xed intervals as long as the ﬁ  rm remains solvent.
For a ﬁ  rm with guaranteed debt, equity value has two components. The 
ﬁ  rst, analogous to the equity of a levered ﬁ  rm without a guarantee, is a call 
option on the operating assets of the ﬁ  rm. The second component is the 
value of the guarantee itself, which is the present value of the (uncertain) 
stream of savings from being able to borrow at the risk- free rate, rather than 
at a risk- adjusted rate. The theoretical model is used to explore how the pres-
ence of a guarantee aﬀects the dynamics of equity returns and their relation 
to the dynamics of operating assets. Since the options pricing approach 
imputes the value and volatility of operating assets from the value and vola-
tility of equity, understanding this relationship is critical to correctly imput-
ing guarantee value.
To examine the value of the guarantees quantitatively, in section 6.3.3 we 
numerically implement a more complex version of the theoretical model 
using an approach similar to that of credit analysis ﬁ  rm KMV (as described 
in Crosbie and Bohn [2003]). It allows for externally ﬁ  nanced asset growth, 
debt adjustment over time, a state- contingent bankruptcy trigger, and state-
 contingent conditional volatility. Expanding on the related analysis in Lucas 
and McDonald (2006), we incorporate a jump process, add new internal 
consistency checks motivated by the theoretical analysis, and investigate a 
wider range of parameter values, particularly the sensitivity to initial capi-
tal. The value of government insurance is calculated using a Monte Carlo 
simulation with risk-  neutral probabilities. We also track the corresponding 
actual distribution of assets, liabilities, and defaults, in order to report the 
implied distribution of insurance payouts.136        Deborah Lucas and Robert McDonald
6.3.1    Single-  Period  Guarantee
We ﬁ rst consider the eﬀect of a guarantee for a ﬁ  rm with a one- period debt 
contract, where a period has a length T. Consider two ﬁ  rms, one with insured 
debt and one with uninsured debt. Superscripts “I” and “U” denote quanti-
ties associated with the insured and uninsured ﬁ  rm, respectively; quantities 
without superscripts are the same for both. Suppose that at time 0 each 
promises the same debt payment at maturity T, D0(T), and have the same 
initial value of operating assets, A0(0). For consistency with a multi-  period 
model, we use the notation Ai(s) to denote the value of assets at time iT  s. 
In the single- period model, i  0. The only source of uncertainty is the value 
of operating assets, which evolve stochastically over time.
At time 0, the equity value of the going concern is the present value of the 
expected payoﬀ to equity holders. Let E0[.] denote the expectation condi-
tional on time 0 information under the risk-  neutral measure. Because both 
ﬁ  rms have the same physical assets and the same promised debt repayment, 
the market value of equity of both ﬁ  rms is: E0 (0)  e–  rT E0[max(0, A0(T) –   
D0(T))], where r is the risk- free rate. Between times 0 and T, the equity values 
remain the same: both claims are a call option on the same underlying assets, 
with identical strike price and maturity.
Unlike for equity, the present value of the debt of the two ﬁ  rms prior to 
maturity is not equal. At any time t  T, the value of insured debt is simply 
the present value of the promised payment: DI
0(t)  e–  r(T–  t)D0(T). The real-
ized payment on uninsured debt will be the promised amount, D0(T), or the 
asset value at time T, A0(T), whichever is less. Hence the value of uninsured 
debt is the present value of the expected payment to debt holders: D0
U(t)  
e–  r(T–  t)Et[min(A0(T),D0(T))].
The value of the T- period guarantee made at time 0, G0(0) is the diﬀerence 
between the initial value of the insured and uninsured debt:
(1)  G0(0)  erT D0(T)  erT E0[min(A0(T), D0(T))] 
 erT E0[max(D0(T)  A0(T),0)].
The expression on the right-  hand side of equation (1) is the value of a put 
option on the operating assets of the ﬁ  rm, where the strike price is the prom-
ised payment on debt. When assets are lognormally distributed, the value can 
be computed using the standard Black Scholes formula for a put option.
We assume that the guarantee value accrues to equity holders.6 Thus at 
time 0, after the guarantee is announced but before debt is issued, the market 
6. To the extent that Fannie and Freddie are able to act as duopolists rather than as competi-
tors, we expect the guarantee value to accrue to their equity holders rather than to mortgage 
borrowers or other stakeholders. Some of the beneﬁ  t may be passed to borrowers in the form 
of lower rates. As long as the pass-  through is a constant proportion of guarantee value, the 
implications for imputing equity value are similar.Valuing Government Guarantees: Fannie and Freddie Revisited    1 3 7
value of equity is G0(0)  E0(0). Since we assume that the scale of operating 
assets is not aﬀected by the presence of a guarantee, G0(0) can be thought of 
as being immediately distributed either via a dividend, a share repurchase, or 
equivalently, as a reduction in the initial investment required from the origi-
nal equity holders. Following the cash distribution, equity price dynamics, 
as described previously, are identical to that of the uninsured ﬁ  rm.
For the government—both from a production cost and opportunity 
cost perspective—the value of the guarantee is also G0(0). The guarantee is 
equivalent to the government writing a put option worth G0(0), and the ﬁ  rm 
would be willing to pay up to G0(0) for the insurance.
6.3.2    Repeated  Debt  Guarantees
The debt guarantee as just modeled is static: the ﬁ  rm issues debt and 
then at time T either pays the debt in full or the government makes up the 
shortfall. This description of the guarantee is overly simpliﬁ  ed along several 
dimensions. First, if the insured ﬁ  rm does not go bankrupt at time T, it will 
likely have the opportunity to issue additional guaranteed debt. Second, 
whether or not the insured ﬁ  rm will declare bankruptcy depends on the 
market value of assets, which is inclusive of current and anticipated future 
guarantees. Third, the insured ﬁ  rm may readjust its capital structure over 
time. For example, if assets appreciate the ﬁ  rm may issue more guaranteed 
debt, whereas if assets fall the ﬁ  rm may buy back some of the guaranteed 
debt. Such behavior will aﬀect the value of the guarantee and its relation 
to the value of equity and operating assets. In this section we derive the 
value of a debt guarantee of an ongoing ﬁ  rm, taking into account these 
considerations.7
Operating Asset Dynamics
We distinguish between “operating assets,” which denote the ﬁ  nancial and 
physical assets of a ﬁ  rm, and “market assets,” which in addition includes 
the value of credit guarantees. As in Merton (1977) and Merton (1976), 
we assume that the evolution of ﬁ  rm operating assets over time has three 
components: an expected return, a random component that is lognormally 
distributed, and (in the simulations only) a discrete jump in value. Speciﬁ  -
cally, under the risk-  neutral distribution, the percentage change in assets 
over time is given by the process:
(2)  dAt  (r  k  ) Atdt   AAtdZt  Atdq
where At is the asset value,  is the volatility parameter, dZt is a Brown-
ian motion, dq is a random variable that over the interval dt is zero with 
7. For tractability, we take the risk of operating assets as exogenous, but the presence of 
a guarantee can also aﬀect the characteristics and dynamics of operating assets (see Keely 
[1990]).138        Deborah Lucas and Robert McDonald
probability 1 –   dt and Y –   1 with probability dt and k  E(Y –   1). The dq 
term permits the value of assets to jump discretely with probability dt over 
an interval dt. The jump takes assets from At to YAt, so the percentage change 
is (Y –   1). Subtracting k from r corrects the drift for the average eﬀect of 
jumps. Formulations like equation (2) appear regularly in the literature on 
debt valuation and bankruptcy.
Valuing a Repeated Guarantee
Here we derive the value of a debt guarantee for a ﬁ  rm with a station-
ary target debt-  to-  operating asset ratio. The ﬁ  rm periodically issues debt 
to ﬁ  xed, one-  period maturity T, setting the amount of new debt to achieve 
its target debt ratio. Each period the ﬁ  rm also chooses whether or not to 
declare bankruptcy so as to maximize the value of equity. For tractability 
we take the target leverage ratio as given, but a similar policy could arise in 
response to a regulatory capital requirement, or as an optimal policy in a 
stationary environment in the presence of ﬁ  xed adjustment costs. Also for 
simplicity we assume that the value of operating assets does not jump; that 
is, Y  1 in equation (2).
We denote the value of a quantity X at time mT  t as Xm(t). We also 
denote the risk-  neutral expectation at time mT conditional on information 
at that time as Em. We can then express the constant target debt ratio as 	erT, 
so that for m  0, 1, . . . ,
(3)  Dm(T)  	ert Am(0).
The equity value and the default decision for the guaranteed ﬁ  rm will 
depend on the expected value of current and future credit guarantees. To 
calculate these quantities, we need to calculate expectations conditional on 
future solvency. Let p j
m(0) denote the risk-  neutral probability, conditional 
on information at time mT, that ﬁ  rm j  {I, U} is not bankrupt at time 
(m  1)T. Further, let j
m(0) be the expectation of the asset growth rate 





m(0) and let  j
m(0)  e–  rT 
j
m(0). In the analysis of a stationary equilib-
rium we drop the time subscripts. These values will depend on the speciﬁ  c 
condition in any period that determines whether the insured ﬁ  rm declares 
bankruptcy.
As in the one-  period case, we compare the value of the guaranteed ﬁ  rm 
with that of a similar uninsured ﬁ  rm, where both have the same operating 
assets and target debt ratio, given by equations (2) and (3). For the guar-
anteed ﬁ  rm, the guarantee remains in place as long as the ﬁ  rm does not 
experience a default. If the ﬁ  rm does default, we assume that the value of 
future debt guarantees is lost forever to current stakeholders. To maintain 
equivalence of operating assets, we assume that the guarantee value, which 
is realized through higher proceeds at the time of each debt issue, is paid 
out immediately as a dividend to the equity holders of the guaranteed ﬁ  rm. Valuing Government Guarantees: Fannie and Freddie Revisited    1 3 9
We denote the cum dividend equity value at time mT as Em– 1(T), and the 
ex-  dividend equity value as Em(0).
The one-  period guarantee value, and hence the incremental dividend 
received by the equity holders of the insured ﬁ  rm, is a constant proportion, 
g, of asset value. This follows from the assumption that the amount of newly 
issued debt is a constant fraction of current asset value, and that the value 
of a one-  period guarantee depends only on the stationary default rule of 
the uninsured ﬁ  rm. Using equations (1) and (3), the proportional guarantee 
value at a debt reset time mT is















This can be rewritten, using the Black Scholes formula for a put option and 
the notation deﬁ  ned in equation (4) as
(5)  g  (1  pU
m(0)) 	  (1  U
m(0)).
Consider a guaranteed ﬁ  rm, which will continue to operate until it declares 
bankruptcy, at a debt reset date mT. If the ﬁ  rm is solvent, it will issue guar-
anteed debt maturing at (m  1)T. What is the solvency condition at time 
mT that maximizes equity value? If the ﬁ  rm remains in business, equity 
holders will receive a call option on the operating assets, and a claim to the 
present value of current and future dividends generated by the guarantee. 
Thus, equity holders will pay oﬀ the debt coming due, Dm– 1(T), as long as 
the value of operating assets plus the guarantee value exceeds the promised 
debt payment.
Notice that for a comparable uninsured ﬁ  rm, the bankruptcy condition is 
Am(T)  Dm– 1(T). The call option on the operating assets has the same value 
as for the insured ﬁ  rm, but there is no additional value from the ongoing 
guarantee. Thus, there are states of the world where an insured ﬁ  rm con-
tinues to operate to preserve future guarantee value, but an uninsured ﬁ  rm 
declares bankruptcy. The diﬀerent solvency conditions imply that the value 
to the ﬁ  rm of the current one-  period guarantee, gAm(0), is no longer equal 
to the one-  period production cost for the government. The former depends 
on the default policy of the uninsured ﬁ  rm, whereas the latter depends on 
the more conservative default policy of the insured ﬁ  rm. The additional 
losses absorbed by the insured ﬁ  rm’s equity holders generate a commensu-
rate reduction in cost to the government of the guarantee.
These considerations suggest that to ﬁ  nd the value of the guarantee to the 
insured ﬁ  rm, it is convenient to characterize it in terms of two components. 
The ﬁ  rst is the present value of the incremental dividend stream generated 
by the guarantee, Am(0). On average, operating assets will grow at their 
expected rate conditional on the insured ﬁ  rm remaining solvent. Thus, the 
value of the dividend stream associated with the perpetual guarantee, start-
ing with current asset value A, is:140        Deborah Lucas and Robert McDonald









The second component, HAm(0), is the cost to equity holders of paying 
oﬀ the debt in states of the world where an uninsured ﬁ  rm would declare 
bankruptcy. At time mT, the expected diﬀerence between gAm(0) and the 







() (– ) 0 + ∫  [	rT Am(0)  ]f(|Am(0))d  Am(0)
where f(|Am(0)) is the probability density of ﬁ  rm asset value at time (m  1)T
 conditional on asset value the previous period, and  denotes the cost 
diﬀerential as a fraction of asset value. Like guarantee value, the present 
value of the cost diﬀerential depends on the expected future growth rate of 
assets, conditional on the probability that the ﬁ  rm remains solvent:









Thus, at mT, if the insured ﬁ  rm is solvent, its equity value exceeds that of 
the uninsured ﬁ  rm by
(9)  Am(0)[  H].
It follows that one reason previous studies that estimated subsidy cost on 
the basis of interest rate spreads reported higher costs than derivative- based 
estimates is that they implicitly set H to 0 in equation (9). The size of the 
bias, however, is diﬃcult to assess. To the extent that the comparison ﬁ  rms 
were banks with subsidized federal deposit insurance and access to FHLB 
advances, it is not clear whether the GSEs or banks have a greater incentive 
to default conservatively to preserve the value of subsidized insurance.
Asset Value and Volatility
We can observe the value and volatility of market equity, dividend policy, 
promised debt repayment, debt maturity, and the risk-  free rate, but must 
infer the value and volatility of assets. The problem of ﬁ  nding the value and 
volatility of market assets is conceptually similar to that considered in Mar-
cus and Shaked (1984), who modeled the value of Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC) insurance in a one- period setting using an options pric-
ing model. As discussed earlier, the value of equity for the guaranteed ﬁ  rm 
is a call option on market assets, which include both operating assets, with 
dynamics given by equation (2), and the value of future guarantees. Using 
equation (9), market assets on a debt reset date mT can be written as:
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Looking forward to the next reset date, the volatility of market assets is 
proportional to that of operating assets: A∗  A[1   –   H]. Further, the 
continuation condition that maximizes equity value for the insured ﬁ  rm at 
each debt reset date is:
(11)  Am(0)[1    H]  Dm1(T).
Then the relation between the distribution of equity returns and asset 
returns can be found following Merton’s approach as the simultaneous solu-
tion to two nonlinear equations, but with Am(0)∗ in place of Am(0), and with 
the dividend yield, ∗, expressed as a share of Am(0)∗ rather than as a share 
of operating assets. Let C(A,D,A,,T) denote the Black-  Scholes value of a 
European call option with underlying assets A, promised debt payment D, 
asset volatility A, dividend yield on market assets (∗), and time to maturity 
T. Then the value of equity for an insured ﬁ  rm is:
(12)  Em(0)  C(Am(0)∗, Dm(T), A∗, ∗, T).
The value and volatility of market assets is found by solving equation (12) 
simultaneously with:
(13)  A∗  E/ (N(d1)Am(0)∗e∗T /  Em(0))
where
(14)  d1  [ln(Am(0)∗ /  Dm(T))  (r  ∗  .52
A∗)T]/ (A∗T.5)
d2  d1  A∗T.5.
Equation (13) comes from the relation, E  (∂E/  ∂A)(A/  E) A.
Discussion
The preceding analysis is useful for understanding the relation between 
the value and volatility of operating assets, equity, and a government guar-
antee on debt. The most straightforward conclusion that emerges is that the 
market value of debt plus equity exceeds the value of operating assets by the 
value of the present value of expected guarantee payments. Expected recov-
eries in the event of default, which depend only on the value of operating 
assets, must be adjusted discretely downward for this eﬀect. The bankruptcy 
trigger must also be adjusted to take into account the eﬀect of guarantee 
value on behavior. However, inferences about the volatility of operating 
assets made on the basis of stock price volatility, using the framework of 
equations (12) and (13) and using observations of equity prices on debt reset 
dates, are basically the same for a ﬁ  rm with or without a guarantee.
This analysis abstracts from what happens between reset dates. As the 
value of operating assets evolves, so too does the probability of solvency 
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expectation of the present value of future guarantees. The ﬁ  xed proportion-
ality of guarantee value to asset value at the next reset date, however, implies 
that the dynamics between reset dates are also unaﬀected by the presence 
of the guarantee.
In fact, government policy may not be stationary, and the value of the 
guarantee may be perceived by the market as changing over time with eco-
nomic and political events or as a function of the ﬁ  nancial situation of the 
GSEs. Whether this would make equity value more or less volatile relative 
to operating assets is unclear, as it would depend on the correlation between 
the strength of the guarantee and the objective situation of the ﬁ  rm, among 
other things. Clearly the model can be modiﬁ  ed to take other hypotheses 
into account, but in its stationary form provides a neutral starting point or 
“guarantee irrelevance theorem” for thinking about these eﬀects.
6.3.3      Monte Carlo Valuation of the Guarantee
Here we employ a discrete time version of equation (2) that is suitable for 
simulation. The calibrated model accommodates more complex assump-
tions about liability management and default behavior, and allows us to 
explore the eﬀect of a variety of regulatory policies on guarantee cost.
Under a risk-  neutral representation in discrete time, operating assets 
evolve according to:




Ah  A,tεh ,
where h is the time step, t subscripts represent time, E is equity, rf is the risk-
 free  rate,  t is externally ﬁ  nanced ﬁ  rm asset growth,  is the dividend yield 
on equity (hence E0/A0 is taken to be the dividend yield on assets), A,t is 
the possibly time- dependent volatility of operating assets, ε is a draw from a 
standard normal distribution,   Y –  1 is the nonstochastic jump size, Ij,t is 
an indicator that a jump has occurred, pjhj is the probability of a jump over 
an interval of length h. The actual evolution of operating assets is identical 
except that rf is replaced by the expected return on assets rA.
Here At represents the value of all of the ﬁ  rm’s operating and investment 
activities, both on and oﬀ balance sheet. It includes the mortgage portfolio, 
the MBS business, derivative market activities, and so forth. Asset value is 
aﬀected by a variety of factors, including interest rate, credit, and other risks. 
Unhedged interest rate risk on the retained portfolio, and the associated 
prepayment and extension risk that arise due to the prepayment option on 
residential mortgages, until recently has been considered the greatest source 
of risk. Credit risk arises both from mortgages held on balance sheet, and 
from the MBS they guarantee. This risk is mitigated by the collateral value 
of the underlying real estate. The remaining risks—political, accounting, 
fraud, liquidity, model, counterparty, and so forth—are potentially impor-
tant but diﬃcult to quantify. Political risks include the possibility of leg-Valuing Government Guarantees: Fannie and Freddie Revisited    1 4 3
islation that restricts growth or increases competition, reducing franchise 
value. Accounting misrepresentations or fraud may cause downward jumps 
in perceived asset value, and can prolong the time between when a problem 
arises and is recognized, increasing the severity of losses.
Importantly, this measure of operating assets represents the true ﬁ  nan-
cial condition of the company, and we take it to be the recovery value in 
bankruptcy. The market value of assets, however, also includes the value of 
current and future expected guarantees, Gt. As suggested by the analysis of 
section 6.3.2, we assume that the guarantee value is a constant proportion 
of the market value of assets:
(16)  At ∗  (1    H)At.
We do not, however, attempt to identify the two components of guarantee 
value separately.
To summarize the diﬀerent roles of operating assets and market value 
assets in the calibrations: operating assets are identiﬁ  ed with the recovery 
value of the ﬁ  rm in bankruptcy. Market value assets determine the continu-
ation condition for the ﬁ  rm. The procedure for setting the initial conditions 
identiﬁ  es the initial market value of assets, as described in a later section.
Liabilities
Representing debt as having a single ﬁ  xed maturity, as we did in sections 
6.3.1 and 6.3.2, abstracts from the possibility of more complex debt rebal-
ancing strategies and future growth opportunities. Closed- form solutions for 
the value of debt under optimal or stationary debt policies have been derived 
for a few special cases (e.g., Leland 1994; Collin-  Dufresne and Goldstein 
2001), but those do not allow for state dependent changes in debt policy or 
continuation rules. To allow for more complicated patterns of behavior we 
choose instead to specify a liability process that allows for gradual adjust-
ment of debt toward a target ratio, with asymmetry in the upward and down-
ward speed of adjustment reﬂ  ecting the relative diﬃculty of reducing debt 
when asset value falls. Book liabilities, L, evolve according to:
(17)  Lth  Lte(rd  	t)h  Itth(∗  Lterdh /  At)At,
where t is the annual rate of adjustment, which may be state dependent, ∗ 
is the target liability to operating asset ratio, and It is an indicator variable 
that equals one in a period where liabilities are adjusted, and 0 otherwise. 
Liabilities grow at a rate rd to cover promised interest.8 In addition, a fraction 
	 of externally ﬁ  nanced growth is supported by debt. This representation 
applies to both the actual and risk-  neutral calculations, but the realized 
paths diﬀer because the return on debt and externally ﬁ  nanced growth take 
8. An alternative would be to reduce assets by the amount of a periodic interest payment, 
which would reduce the scale of the enterprises over time relative to what is assumed here.144        Deborah Lucas and Robert McDonald
on diﬀerent values in each instance, and the ratio of assets to liabilities 
displays diﬀerent dynamics. Although computationally it would be straight-
forward to add volatility to liabilities, we assume instead that the estimated 
volatility of assets implicitly captures volatility arising from all sources 
including liabilities.
The promised interest rate, rd, depends on what one assumes about the 
strength of the government guarantee. If it were completely ﬁ  rm, and 
abstracting from other diﬀerences between Treasuries and agency securities, 
then setting rd equal to rf would be appropriate. In the calibrations we assume 
a positive rate spread that is somewhat smaller than the average observed in 
the data. This is consistent with our view that the guarantee is not risky, but 
that there are some other features that make Treasury debt more valuable 
than agency securities.
Insolvency Trigger
Consistent with the analysis in section 6.3.2, we assume that the solvency 
condition depends on the market value of assets relative to book liabilities. 
As in Merton (1977), we assume that bankruptcy only occurs during peri-
odic audits. If the solvency condition is not met, the auditor closes the ﬁ  rm 
and makes a guarantee payment to debt holders.
Several insolvency triggers have been proposed in the literature. One that 
is roughly consistent with observed bankruptcy experience is to liquidate 
the ﬁ  rm when the market value of assets falls below the level of current 
liabilities, plus half of the book value of long-  term liabilities. Another is 
that the market value of assets falls below a fraction of the total book value 
of liabilities. We use the latter type of rule, since distinguishing between the 
long-   and short-  term liabilities of Fannie and Freddie is complicated by 
the frequent maturity conversions taking place through derivatives market 
transactions. Given this rule, we are interested in ﬁ  nding the bankruptcy 
trigger value—the proportional gap between assets and liabilities—that 
maximizes the value of equity. In simulations we calculate the guarantee 
cost and the value of equity for a range of bankruptcy triggers and we report 
the results for which the value of equity is maximized.
In practice, frictions are likely to increase the guarantee cost. A drawn-
 out reorganization or closure process, or regulatory forbearance, can add to 
guarantee costs by allowing a failing ﬁ  rm to continue operating. This eﬀect 
can be exacerbated if asset volatility increases with ﬁ  nancial distress. This 
could occur, for instance, if there is a correlation between conditions that 
cause distress and overall market volatility; if distress raises the cost of hedg-
ing; or if management deliberately takes more risk to try to make up for past 
losses. This increase in volatility may not be easily discernable in historical 
data, both because its occurrence is a low probability event, and because 
it is likely to persist for relatively short periods of time when it does occur. 
In Lucas and McDonald (2006) we found this to be a signiﬁ  cant potential 
driver of guarantee cost, and we also incorporate it into these estimates.Valuing Government Guarantees: Fannie and Freddie Revisited    1 4 5
Equity
Equations (15) and (17), which govern the evolution of ﬁ  rm operating 
assets and book liabilities, respectively, implicitly deﬁ  ne the cash ﬂ  ows to 
equity. Those consist of the dividend payment each period, and cash raised 
from subsequent debt issues not used to ﬁ  nance exogenous asset growth. 
Exogenous asset growth not assumed to be debt ﬁ  nanced further implies a 
negative cash ﬂ  ow to initial equity holders, or equivalently an equity issue.
The time 0 value of equity is the present value of all future cash ﬂ  ows to 
equity. That value is computed in the Monte Carlo simulations under the 
risk-  neutral measure, by discounting cash ﬂ  ows at the risk-  free rate. As a 
proxy for cash ﬂ  ows beyond the simulation horizon T, the terminal value 
of equity at time T is approximated by AT –   LT. This neglects the value of 
the guarantee after time T, but that eﬀect becomes small as T increases. 
Calculating the implied equity value using this approach provides a valuable 
check on the internal consistency of the model, since it can be compared to 
the observed equity value used to determine the initial value of assets and 
liabilities.
Deriving Initial Conditions and Accounting for Guarantee Value
The initial market value and volatility of ﬁ  rm assets must be estimated 
since these quantities are not directly observable. The analysis of section 
6.3.2 suggests that we can do this using Merton’s framework, where equity 
can be valued as a call option on the ﬁ  rm’s market assets. Speciﬁ  cally, we use 
equations (12) and (13), calibrated with market and balance sheet data from 
Fannie and Freddie, to estimate the initial market value of assets and their 
volatility.9 What is tricky conceptually is to choose a horizon for debt, since 
liabilities follow equation (17) and there is no speciﬁ  c maturity date. We use 
the reported average eﬀective maturity of debt as a proxy, and consider the 
sensitivity of the results to varying the assumed debt maturity.
We use the estimated asset volatility and asset value to compute the cost of 
the guarantee. As part of the estimation, we also compute the market value 
of equity for Fannie and Freddie. This later serves as an internal consistency 
check against the equity value derived from estimated discounted cash ﬂ  ows 
accruing to equity.
6.4    Calibration  and  Results
The model in the base case is calibrated to year-  end 2005, a time when 
the reported ﬁ  nancial condition of both ﬁ  rms was strong. We will then look 
at how the estimated cost of the guarantee to the government changes as 
9. We also used this approach for deriving initial conditions for asset value and volatility in 
Lucas and McDonald (2005). Marcus and Shaked (1984) show that the same equations can 
be used to estimate the value of the government guarantee, and use that insight to estimate the 
value of deposit insurance for US banks.146        Deborah Lucas and Robert McDonald
their ﬁ  nancial condition deteriorates, and the sensitivity to other parametric 
assumptions and policy variables.
Three critical inputs for guarantee valuation are market value equity, 
equity volatility, and liabilities. Table 6.1 reports these statistics, along with 
the other parameters used for the base case. Data acquisition for 2005 was 
complicated because Fannie Mae delayed in ﬁ  ling ﬁ  nancial reports since it 
had to restate its ﬁ  nancial statements through 2004. As of December 2006 
it had not ﬁ  led any further ﬁ  nancial reports. Fannie did, however, provide 
monthly information on the size of their mortgage portfolio and MBS out-
standing. We have imputed some of the missing information for Fannie by 
relying on Freddie’s disclosures. Speciﬁ  cally, we estimate book liabilities for 
Fannie and assume that the ratio of liabilities to retained mortgages is the 
same for both ﬁ  rms.
We infer base case equity volatility using historical implied annualized 
thirty-  day volatility from option prices. The series are shown for Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac in ﬁ  gures 6.1 and 6.2. Both series are graphed against 
thirty-  day implied volatility for the Standard and Poor (S&P) 500 index 
(the VIX index) in order to highlight changes in volatility, which are ﬁ  rm 
speciﬁ  c rather than market-  wide. Implied volatility for both ﬁ  rms ranges 
from 20 percent to 60 percent, with an average of about 30 percent, our 
base estimate for both ﬁ  rms. Implied volatility in 2006 and 2007 remained 
at similar levels.
Estimates of guarantee value are based on 50,000 Monte Carlo runs, for 
ten-   and twenty-  year horizons. As in Lucas and McDonald (2006), asset 
volatility is assumed to increase to four times its normal level when assets 
fall to 101 percent of liabilities, representing increased volatility in periods of 
ﬁ  nancial distress. Management and regulatory decisions (debt adjustment 
and solvency determination) are evaluated at a quarterly frequency, while 
assets returns are calculated at a monthly frequency. Several variables are 
parameterized diﬀerently than in our previous study. The ability to adjust 
down liabilities is more constrained, a change that achieves greater consis-
tency between observed and computed equity values. We set exogenous asset 
growth to zero (in contrast to the 6 percent previously assumed), because 
it seemed in 2005 unlikely that future growth would match historical rates. 
Liabilities still grow on average at about 9 percent annually, however, because 
of the assumption that interest accumulates as increased debt and because 
the expected return on assets exceeds the dividend rate, creating growth from 
retained earnings that, on average, causes the target debt level to grow.
As discussed in the previous section, using equations (12) and (13) to esti-
mate initial asset value and asset volatility is problematic because it requires 
a ﬁ  xed debt maturity as an input. Nevertheless, it is a useful starting point 
for estimation. In 2004, the last year for which we have obtained average 
maturity data, Fannie’s eﬀective debt maturity was 2.65 years and Freddie’s 
was 3.05 years. Since the agencies normally match the duration of assets and Table 6.1  Base case parameter values, year-  end 2005
Short name   Value   Description
Fannie Mae
    FLinit $744 Initial imputed book value of liabilities ($ billions)
    MVEquity $48,750 Initial market value of equity ($ millions)
  Dividend  yield 0.028
Freddie Mac
    FLinit $727 Initial book value of liabilities ($ billions)
    MVEquity $47,056 Initial market value of equity ($ millions)
  Dividend  yield 0.03
Common values
  FAvol_h FAvol∗4 Firm asset volatility in high volatility state
  rf 0.045 Risk  free  rate
    rd 0.0475 Promised return on debt
    FAer_a 0.053 Firm assets expected return (actual)
    FAer 0.045 Firm assets expected return (risk-  neutral)
    FLrate_d 0.03 / 4 Quarterly adjustment of liabilities to lower target
    FLrate_u 0.8 / 4 Quarterly adjustment of liabilities to higher target
  growth 0.0 Externally  ﬁ  nanced growth if enough capital
    growth_debt 1 Proportion of external ﬁ  nancing that is debt
    trig_volh 1.01 Trigger of assets/liabilities for higher volatility
    look 4 Frequency of checking bankruptcy trigger per year
    look_l 4 Frequency of updating debt
    FLFAtarget .93 Target liability to asset ratio
  newFLFA 1 Proportion  of  debt  ﬁ  nanced exogenous asset growth
    nmonte 50,000 Number of Monte Carlo simulations
    nyear 10 Number of years in each simulation run
  nfreq   12   Time steps per year
Fig. 6.1    Implied volatility for Fannie Mae and for the S&P 500 (VIX), 1996 to 2006
Source: Optionmetrics and Yahoo.148        Deborah Lucas and Robert McDonald
liabilities, it seems likely that their eﬀective maturity of debt increased over 
the next year with the lengthening eﬀective maturity of mortgages. Table 6.2 
illustrates the eﬀect of the debt maturity assumption on implied asset value 
and volatility, using the parameter assumptions in table 6.1, for maturities 
of 2.5, 5, and 7.5 years. Both implied asset value and volatility increases with 
assumed debt maturity. Although the increases appear small in percentage 
terms, model estimates are very sensitive to assumed asset volatility, and 
hence to the initial maturity assumption.
Table 6.3 reports the guarantee and equity values in the base case with no 
jumps in asset value, and using initial conditions assuming Fannie’s (Fred-
die’s) eﬀective debt maturity is 2.65 (3.05) years. The default trigger is that 
which maximizes the value of equity. The combined guarantee value over 
twenty years is $65 billion. The guarantee value expressed as a premium 
rate on liabilities is 23 to 27 bps. For both ﬁ  rms, the implied equity values 
are somewhat higher than the observed values used to estimate asset vola-
tility and value, but small changes in parameters (e.g., volatility) can easily 
reconcile the equity values.
We also report the risk-  neutral and actual probabilities of default over 
the indicated horizon. The risk- neutral probability is inferred from observed 
prices and model assumptions. If the assets have a positive risk premium, 
Fig. 6.2    Implied volatility for Freddie Mac and for the S&P 500 (VIX), 1996 to 2006
Source: Optionmetrics and Yahoo.Valuing Government Guarantees: Fannie and Freddie Revisited    1 4 9
the risk-  neutral probability is an upper bound on the physical probabil-
ity of default. Identifying a physical probability of default requires mak-
ing an additional assumption about the required rate of return on assets. 
We follow Lucas and McDonald (2006) and assume a required rate of 
return on assets 80 basis points greater than the risk free rate in the base 
case. Given the implied physical probabilities, we can also compute value 
at risk (VaR). Under the base case assumptions, we compute a VaR over 
twenty years at the 5 percent level for Fannie (Freddie) of $165 billion 
($112 billion). At the 1 percent level the VaR increases to $252 billion ($201 
billion).
Table 6.4 shows the eﬀects of exogenously varying the default trigger 
rather than setting it at a value maximizing level as in the base case in table 
6.3. As the default trigger increases from 1.0, there is a rapid increase in 
equity value and an increase in the premium rate. (With continuous moni-
toring and no bankruptcy costs, at a trigger of 1.0 there would be a zero 
default premium paid on bonds because bondholders would have 100 per-
cent recovery. Because bankruptcy can only occur at discrete times, bond-
holders do on average suﬀer a loss when bankruptcy occurs.) As the trig-
ger increases from 1.0, equity values increase, the premium rate increases, 
and the probability of bankruptcy declines. The last two observations 
are reconciled by the greater severity of defaults when the trigger level 
is higher.
Since the true risk premium associated with assets is subject to consider-
able uncertainty, table 6.5 reports, for the base case for Fannie, the sensitiv-
ity of the reported actual bankruptcy probability to the assumption about 
Table 6.2  Implied asset value and volatility as function of assumed debt maturity
    Fannie   Freddie   Fannie   Freddie   Fannie   Freddie
Horizon (yrs) 2.5 2.5 5 5 7.5 7.5
Asset value 797.0 778.4 800.4 781.2 803.1 780.9
Asset vol   .0208   .0185   .0225   .0204   .0238   .0230
Table 6.3  Base case 2005 guarantee value estimates
    Fannie  Freddie  Fannie  Freddie
Horizon 10 10 20 20
Guarantee cost ($ billions) 14.46 9.16 35.49 29.50
Premium rate (bp) 20.53 16.46 27.01 22.91
Implied equity value ($ billions) 49.99 45.40 55.78 48.73
Default prob. (risk-  neutral) 0.19 0.18 0.34 0.34
Default prob. (actual) 0.050 0.033 0.084 0.059
Default trigger (L/A)   1.08   1.07   1.13   1.11150        Deborah Lucas and Robert McDonald
the risk premium on assets. When the risk premium is zero, the bankruptcy 
probability is the same as the risk-  neutral default probability reported in 
table 6.3, and when the risk premium is 80 basis points, it is the same as the 
actual default probability reported in table 6.3. It is important to keep in 
mind that our cost estimates of the credit guarantees do not depend on the 
assumption about the risk premium.
Next, we consider the eﬀect of discrete jumps down in asset value, where 
trend growth is adjusted up so that average asset growth is the same as 
the table 6.3 calculations. The probability of a jump is taken to be 3 per-
cent per year, and the jump size is 5 percent. The results are reported in 
Table 6.4  Eﬀect of changing the bankruptcy trigger






probability   Premium rate (bp)
Fannie Mae
1.00 42.57 70.26 24.83 14.17
1.03 48.85 58.12 17.84 21.17
1.06 52.79 48.58 13.68 24.74
1.09 54.87 41.42 10.98 26.42
1.12 55.69 35.85 9.04 27.01
1.15 55.60 31.27 7.48 26.90
Freddie Mac
1.00 38.24 67.38 17.11 11.57
1.03 43.85 54.33 11.77 18.09
1.06 47.01 44.57 8.67 21.22
1.09 48.41 37.49 6.86 22.65
1.12 48.71 31.75 5.51 22.83
1.15   48.17   27.22   4.45   22.46
Note: All parameters are those given in table 6.1.
Table 6.5  Sensitivity of physical default probability to asset risk premium 
(Fannie Mae)








  140   1.73  
Note: All parameters are those given in table 6.1 with a twenty-  year horizon.Valuing Government Guarantees: Fannie and Freddie Revisited    1 5 1
table 6.6. The eﬀect is to increase the probability of default and the value 
of the guarantee by $10 to $20 billion. Increasing the size of the jump to 
10 percent increases the twenty-  year cost for Fannie to $43.8 billion, but 
also increase the equity value to $65.8 billion, signiﬁ  cantly higher than its 
observed value. It appears that plausible jump processes increase estimated 
cost, but not enough to reconcile options-  based and spread-  based cost 
estimates.
Options-  based estimates of guarantee value are quite sensitive to the 
assumed initial value of assets. In the months prior to Fannie and Fred-
die being put into receivership, their stock prices fell substantially and the 
underlying asset value for each ﬁ  rm clearly declined as well. It is interesting 
to see how the inferred guarantee value changes when the underlying assets 
suﬀer a loss. To illustrate the sensitivity to changes in initial leverage ratios, 
table 6.7 reports on guarantee values as a function of the initial ratio of 
market liabilities to market assets, holding other parameters the same as in 
the base case. In this table we simply reduce assets, holding asset volatility 
constant, and examine the eﬀect on the value of equity and the insurance 
value.10
The optionality inherent in being an equity holder can be seen by con-
sidering the change in equity value as a function of the decline in asset 
value. A 5 percent decline in the value of assets for Fannie is about $40 bil-
lion. The decline in imputed equity value is about half of that when assets 
decline by the ﬁ  rst $40 billion, and less than a third of that amount when 
assets decline by an additional $40 billion. The increase in the guarantee 
cost for the two scenarios is substantial, at $15 billion and $37 billion. 
The physical default probability also increases at an increasing rate with 
a drop in asset values. Similar results, not reported here, are obtained for 
Freddie.
Table 6.6  2005 Guarantee value estimates with jumps
  Fannie Freddie Fannie Freddie
Horizon  10 10 20 20
Guarantee cost ($ billions)  16.54  19.30  38.25  32.32
Premium  rate  (bp)  23.62 13.30 29.23 25.23
Implied equity value ($ billions)  51.80  47.37  58.96  51.90
Default  prob.  (risk-  neutral)  .21 .19 .34 .34
Default  prob.  (actual)  .068 .053 .112 .090
Trigger  1.09 1.08 1.14 1.12
Note: 3 percent annual probability of 5 percent reduction in asset size.
10. An alternative approach would be to use observed equity value and volatility during 
the summer of 2008. However, Fannie and Freddie were not typical defaulting companies, 
and there was great uncertainty about whether, when, and how the federal government would 
intervene. This uncertainty makes it problematic to interpret observed market volatility.152        Deborah Lucas and Robert McDonald
6.5    Conclusions
In this chapter we develop a valuation model for a ﬁ  rm that can continue 
to periodically issue insured debt that is a ﬁ  xed percentage of the value of 
its operating (i.e., nonguarantee) assets as long as it remains solvent. We use 
the model to explore whether the presence of such a guarantee changes the 
relation between the equity value of the ﬁ  rm, and the value of operating 
assets. This is important because in derivative-  based approaches to valuing 
debt guarantees, the unobservable value and volatility of assets is inferred 
from the observable value and volatility of equity. If the presence of the 
guarantee changes these relations (for instance, by aﬀecting equity dynam-
ics), the inferences could be biased.
The theoretical analysis reveals that in fact, the presence of the guaran-
tee does not fundamentally change the relation between the volatility of 
levered equity and the underlying assets, leaving intact the standard equa-
tions underlying derivatives-  based pricing. It does, however, create a wedge 
between the value of operating assets and the market value of debt and 
equity equal to the present value of the future stream of income generated 
by the guarantee. This aﬀects the initial conditions for derivatives- based esti-
mates. The analysis also reveals that the spread- based approach is upwardly 
biased when no correction is made for the lower predicted default rate for 
guaranteed ﬁ  rms that optimally default less often to preserve the value of 
future guarantees.
To provide estimates that take into account these adjustments and that 
also incorporate potentially important complications such as jumps in 
underlying asset value, time-  varying volatility, and a more complicated 
default policy, we calibrate and simulate a computational version of the 
model. We ﬁ  nd that an insurance premium of 20 to 30 bps on Fannie and 
Freddie debt would be fair compensation for the default risk assumed by the 
government in the benign economic environment of year-  end 2005. How-
ever, when asset values decline by 10 percent, it causes the fair premium to 
more than double, all else equal. This highlights the sensitivity of guarantee 
Table 6.7  2005 Guarantee value estimates, varying initial equity for Fannie
   Fannie  Fannie
  Fannie  –5% assets  –10% assets
Horizon 20  20  20
Guarantee cost ($ billions)  35.49  50.84  72.50
Premium rate (bp)  27.01  44.64  80.81
Implied equity value ($ billions)  55.78  36.02  23.84
Default prob. (risk-  neutral)  .34  .43  .56
Default prob. (actual)  .084  .175  .394Valuing Government Guarantees: Fannie and Freddie Revisited    1 5 3
values to changes in equity value in highly levered ﬁ  nancial institutions, and 
also demonstrates the usefulness of these types of models in setting risk-
  based insurance premiums.
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Comment  Alan J. Marcus
This chapter is a valuable contribution to the literature on the too-  often 
unacknowledged growth in explicit and implicit government guarantee pro-
grams. While the Federal Government did not originally provide explicit 
“full faith and credit” backing of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac debt, its 
implicit support was, as Lucas and McDonald (henceforth, LM) point out, 
widely acknowledged and visibly apparent in the yields at which the two 
ﬁ  rms were able to issue their bonds. More recently, of course, that guarantee 
became explicit.
Lucas and McDonald estimate the ex-  ante present value in 2005 of the 
combined guarantee to the two ﬁ  rms at around $65 billion over twenty 
years. This is a considerable amount; moreover, as a mean, it is actually a 
conservative estimate of the government’s potential exposure. A value-  at-
  risk estimate focusing on bad-   or worst-  case scenarios obviously would be 
multiples of this value. When comparing this implicit guarantee with some 
of the others discussed in this volume, it is good to remember that the risks 
of some programs have been assessed by worst- case scenarios and others by 
midpoint estimates. By either standard, Freddie- Fannie guarantees must be 
ranked among the more important contingent government obligations, and 
a careful demonstration of this point is by itself an important contribution 
of the chapter.
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